The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union by Black, Steven G.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1995 | Issue 4 Article 6
11-1-1995
The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup
Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the
Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union
Steven G. Black
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven G. Black, The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of
Plainfield-Union, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 1321 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1995/iss4/6
The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup 
Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the 
Restoration Principle of Plainfield- Union 
We realize that we only have the land on loan, and that 
we must look after it properly.' 
"It has been estimated that by the end of the century, the 
costs associated with the cleanup of the environment will 
approach $160 billion per year."2 Such substantial expendi- 
tures will have serious economic effects on corporate America, 
the U.S. government, and ultimately on every individual 
residing in this country. 
The deductibility of expenditures associated with the 
cleanup of hazardous waste has not been specifically addressed 
by the federal courts3 or Congress. Absent judicial or 
legislative guidance, the Internal Revenue S e ~ c e  has 
struggled to determine whether costs associated with 
environmental cleanup activities are deductible as business 
expenses in the year incurred: or alternatively, if these costs 
are to be capitalized under 5 263 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.5 Two conflicting policies are involved: (1) promoting 
voluntary environmental cleanup activities; and (2) formulating 
a tax revenue plan that will alleviate, if not eliminate, the five 
1. Harlan S. Byrne, Heidemij: A Global Mr. Clean, BARRON'S, Sept. 5, 1994, 
a t  18 (quoting Heidemij's 1993 annual report). 
2. Paul L. Langer, Significant Current Developments in Environmental 
Insurance Coverage, in ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMS AND 
LITIGATION 1994, a t  129, 129 (PLI Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series 
No. 690, 1994). 
3. The two most relevant cases are Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 
39 T.C. 333 (1962) (addressing the deductibility of costs associated with cleaning 
and lining a water pipe with cement), and INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 
79, 87-89 (1992) (holding that expenditures that benefit future periods must be 
capitalized). 
4. See I.R.C. 4 162 (1994). A deduction allowed in the year the expense was 
incurred is referred to as a "current deduction" throughout this comment. 
5. I.R.C. 9 263 (1994). 
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trillion dollar national debt? Grappling with these policy 
issues, the Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") has 
recently issued three pronouncements that convey mixed 
 result^.^ The two most recent pronouncements8 adopt the 
"restoration principle" that was advanced by the Tax Court 
over thirty years ago: but which had largely been ignored by 
the Service in previous  pronouncement^.'^ 
The purpose of this comment is to explore the current 
position of the Internal Revenue Service regarding the 
deductibility of environmental cleanup costs and to propose a 
strategy which balances the complex policy issues involved in 
capitalizing or deducting environmental cleanup costs. Part I1 
discusses statutory and regulatory authority that govern the 
availability of a current business deduction. An illustration in 
Part I1 depicts the tax benefit obtained by receiving a current 
deduction of an expenditure under 5 162 rather than 
capitalizing the expenditure under 5 263. Part I11 examines 
judicial and administrative interpretations of the statutes and 
regulations and portrays the difficulties the Service has 
encountered in developing a consistent environmental cleanup 
6. As will be discussed in Part IVY allowing a tax incentive to encourage 
voluntary environmental cleanup will reduce tax revenue. However, if no incentive 
is given and no cleanup occurs, the government may be called upon to clean up 
the property. Such government involvement has proven to be extremely costly to 
taxpayers. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
7. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (allowing deduction for soil remediation 
and groundwater treatment costs); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995) 
(disallowing deduction for environmental impact studies and related legal fees); 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994) (disallowing deduction for asbestos 
removal). 
8. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 
1995). 
9. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at  338 (addressing the deductibility of costs 
associated with cleaning and lining a water pipe with cement). The term 
"restoration principlen of Plainfield-Union was first used by the Service in Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). The valuation test of Plainfield-Union has 
also been referred to as the "before-and-after test." 
The restoration principle analyzes whether expenditures increase the value of 
property. The process involves "compar[ing] the status of the asset aRer the 
expenditure with the status of that asset before the condition arose that 
necessitated the expenditure." Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (citing Plainfield- 
Union, 39 T.C. at  338). For a detailed analysis of the restoration principle, see 
infra part 1II.A. 
10. Previous letter rulings of the Service have discussed the restoration 
principle of Plainfield-Union in connection with cleanup of environmentally 
hazardous materials, but the Service had declined to give the principle much 
weight. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 
(Apr. 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1992). 
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policy. Part I11 also summarizes the current law by analyzing 
the most recent I.R.S. pronouncements and their application of 
Plainfield-Union's restoration principle." Part IV addresses 
the competing social policies of decreasing the national debt 
and promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous materials. Part 
V concludes by proposing a two-step method for allowing a 
current deduction of environmental cleanup costs that is in 
harmony with the competing social policies. 
11. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
In determining whether environmental cleanup costs are 
deductible, a taxpayer must examine several sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code that authorize or deny a business 
deduction. The underlying issue is whether corporations will be 
allowed a business deduction under I.R.C. 5 162,12 or, 
alternatively, whether such costs must be capitalized under 
I.R.C. 5 263 and depreciated over a substantial number of 
years. l3 
A. Section 162: Deduction for Ordinary and Necessary 
Expenses 
In order for environmental cleanup expenditures to be 
deducted in the current tax year, they must be ordinary busi- 
ness expenses that qualify for a deduction under 8 162 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.14 Section 162 allows a deduction for 
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur- 
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or bu~iness.'"~ 
11. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338. 
12. I.R.C. $ 162 (1994). 
13. See I.R.C. $5 167-68, 263 (1994). Section 168(c)(l) states that the 
applicable recovery period for nonresidential real property is 39 years. See infka 
part 1I.C for an illustration of the financial benefit derived from receiving a 
current deduction of an expenditure under $ 162 rather than capitalizing an 
expenditure under $ 263 and depreciating that amount over 39 years. Since land is 
not depreciable under $3 167-68, any costs that are capitalized to land may not be 
recovered until the property is subsequently sold. 
14. I.R.C. $8 161-162 (1994). 
15. I.R.C. fi 162(a) (1994); see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 
(1966) (holding that the term "necessary" imposes "only the minimal requirement 
that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of the 
[taxpayer's] business,'" (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933))); 
Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) (To qualify as "ordinary" the expense 
must relate to a transaction "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of 
business involved."). 
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Treasury Regulation section 1. 162-1(a)16 provides the follow- 
ing examples of expenses that are considered "ordinary and 
necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to 
the taxpayer's trade or business":17 cost of goods sold, manage- 
ment expenses, commissions, labor, supplies, incidental repairs, 
operating expenses of automobiles used in a trade or business, 
business traveling expenses while away fkom home, advertis- 
ing, selling expenses, insurance premiums, and rent? If the 
expenses are not necessary and ordinary, they must be capital- 
ized and either depreciated under §§ 167 and 168 of the Code, 
or added to the value of the real estate.lg 
Environmental cleanup of hazardous materials generally 
involves the restoration of contaminated land and structures to 
an uncontaminated state. This procedure is similar to the re- 
pair of other business assets that have been damaged. Treasury 
Regulation section 1.162-4 permits the cost of certain repairs to 
be deducted in the current tax year under 5 162 if certain con- 
ditions have been met.20 In order to qualify, a repair must sat- 
isfy all parts of the following four-pronged test: (1) the repair 
must be "incidental," (2) the cost of the repair must not "mate- 
rially add to the value of the property," (3) the cost of the re- 
pair must not "appreciably prolong [the useful] life" of the prop- 
erty, and (4) the purpose of the repair must be to keep the 
property in an "ordinarily efficient operating c~ndition."~' 
Environmental cleanup costs generally must satisfy the 
four-pronged "incidental repair" test of Treasury Regulation 
section 1.162-4 in order to qualify for a current deduction under 
5 162. However, if the environmental cleanup costs are part of 
an ongoing plan of rehabilitation, Revenue Ruling 88-57 disal- 
lows a current deduction and requires the expenditures to be 
~api ta l ized .~~ A plan of rehabilitation is evidenced by periodic 
repairs that, standing alone, could qualify for a current deduc- 
tion, but when viewed together constitute an integrated plan to 
increase the useful life or value of an asset.23 Considering the 
16. Treas. Reg. $ 1.162-l(a) (as amended in 1993). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See I.R.C. $$ 167-168, 263 (1994). 
20. Treas. Reg. $ 1.162-4 (1960). 
21. Id. 
22. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36; see also Wehrli v. United States, 400 
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). 
23. See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36; Wehrli, 400 F.2d at 690. For exam- 
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enormous time and expense oRen involved in environmental 
cleanup activities, related costs are difficult to label as "inci- 
dental repairs" not incurred as part of a general plan of reha- 
b i l i t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Traditionally, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to 
establish that an expenditure qualifies for a current deduction 
under 5 1 6 2 . ~ ~  The Service recently explained: 
Section 161 of the Code clarifies the relationship between 
deductions allowable under section 162 and capital expendi- 
tures under section 263. Section 161 provides that the deduc- 
tions allowed in Part VI [of the Code], including section 162, 
are subject to the exceptions set forth in Part M [of the Code], 
including section 263. Thus, the capitalization rules of section 
263 take precedence over the rules for deductions under sec- 
tion 162.~~ 
Consequently, if a taxpayer fails to carry her burden of proof 
under 5 162, the capitalization rules of 5 263 will apply.27 
B. Section 263: Capital Expenditures 
Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no 
deduction is allowed for any costs associated with "permanent 
ple, suppose a large university replaces a burned-out fluorescent light with a new 
light that is guaranteed to have a longer life than the previous light. Viewed 
alone, the replacing of a light is an incidental repair expense and receives a cur- 
rent deduction under § 162. However, if the university decides to replace all of its 
old fluorescent lights with more efficient lights over an extended period of time, 
the process is considered to be a single event for purposes of Revenue Ruling 88- 
57, and the collective costs must be capitalized under 263. See generally Rev. 
Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. 
24. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993) (stating that the cleanup of 
PCB contamination "constitutes a general plan of rehabilitation and restoration of 
taxpayer's properties"). Despite Regulation 1.162-4 and Revenue Ruling 88-57, 
Revenue Ruling 94-38 allowed a current deduction for soil remediation and ongoing 
groundwater treatment costs. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. Revenue Ruling 94- 
38 did not indicate whether soil remediation and groundwater treatment costs are 
incidental repairs or part of a general plan of rehabilitation. The Service concluded 
that the "soil remediation and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures do not 
result in improvements that increase the value of [taxpayer's] property because 
[taxpayer] has merely restored its soil and groundwater to their approximate condi- 
tion before they were contaminated by [taxpayer's] manufacturing operations." Id. 
25. "[I]ncome tax deductions are 'a matter of legislative grace' and . . . the 
taxpayer bears the 'burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduc- 
tion. . . .'" Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995) (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 83 (1992)). 
26. Id. (citing INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at  83.) 
27. See I.R.C. 5 161 (1994). 
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improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any 
property or estate.''28 Treasury Regulation section 1.263(a)- 
l(b) states that capital expenditures (1) "add to the value" of 
the pr~perty;~ (2) "substantially prolong the [property's] use- 
ful life,"30 or (3) "adapt property to a new or different use."31 
Although 5 263 is well defined and strictly applied, certain 
statutory exceptions are granted for activities such as the "de- 
velopment of mines," "research and development expenditures," 
"soil and water conservation," "expenditures by farmers for 
fertilizer," "expenditures for removal of architectural and trans- 
portation barriers to the handicapped and elderly," and up to 
$17,500 for purchase of personal tangible property used in a 
trade or business.32 However, Congress has not yet granted an 
exception for environmental cleanup costs. 
C. Impact of Applying $ 162 Rather than $263 
The effect of applying 9 162 rather than 5 263 can be 
shown by the following illustration. Assume X Corporation has 
voluntarily commenced cleanup of environmentally hazardous 
materials located in a corporate warehouse for a total estimat- 
ed cost of $1 million. X Corporation's marginal tax rate is 40%. 
If all expenditures satisfy the four-prong test of Treasury Regu- 
lation section 1.162-4, the "incidental repairs" are fully deduct- 
ible under $ 162. Consequently, the immediate tax deduction 
reduces the overall cost from $1 million in before-tax dollars to 
$600,000 in after-tax dollars." In contrast, if all cleanup costs 
are treated as capital expenditures and the amount is depre- 
ciated over thirty-nine years," X Corporation's net cost is 
$915,562.~~ Hence, X Corporation saves $315,562 ($915,562 - 
28. Id. $ 263. 
29. Treas. Reg. $ 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1994). 
30. Id. Treasury Regulation 8 1.263(a)-2(a) explains that capital expenditures 
create "property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." Treas. 
Reg. $ 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987). 
31. Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1994). 
32. I.R.C. 4 263(a)(l)(A)-(E), (G) (1994). 
33. The tax savings are computed as follows: $1,000,000 x 40% tax rate = 
$400,000. The net cost would be $1,000,000 - $400,000 = $600,000. These calcula- 
tions assume a combined federal and state income tax rate of 40 percent. 
The effect of the above calculation is that for each dollar spent on cleanup 
costs, X Corporation's net cost is 60 cents-the other 40 cents is contributed by the 
federal and state government in the form of an income tax deduction. 
34. I.R.C. 4 168(c)(l) (1994) (requiring nonresidential real property to be de- 
preciated over 39 years). 
35. The overall tax benefit will be $84,438 realized over 39 years and com- 
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$600,000) or 32 percent if the cleanup costs are deemed to be 
deductible in the current tax year rather than depreciated over 
39 years. As will be discussed in Part IV.B., a 32 percent reduc- 
tion in cleanup costs will encourage many corporations to vol- 
untarily commence cleanup activities; disallowing current de- 
ductions will, of course, have the opposite effect. 
111. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRECEDENT 
The Internal Revenue Service has struggled to interpret 
the interplay of 55 162 and 263 regarding environmental clean- 
up costs. This Part summarizes the most significant cases and 
I .R. S. pronouncements that directly impact the deductibility of 
environmental cleanup costs. The most critical factor that has 
evolved in obtaining a current deduction for cleanup costs un- 
der 5 162 is the application of the "restoration principle" devel- 
oped by the Tax Court over thirty years ago in Plainfield-Un- 
ion, Inc. v. p om missioner.^^ 
A. Plainfield-Union Water v. Commissioner 
In 1962, the Tax Court in Plainfield-Union applied a be- 
fore-and-after test3? to determine whether the cost of cleaning 
and lining a water pipe with cement should be deducted or 
capitalized. The Service argued that "the value of the pipe to 
[the taxpayer] was materially increased by the expenditure and 
that it is, therefore, a capital expendit~re."~~ The Tax Court 
did not agree with this argument and pointed out that "any 
properly performed repair adds value as compared with the 
situation existing immediately prior to that r e ~ a i r . " ~  In deter- 
mining whether a cost must be capitalized, "[tlhe proper test 
would be whether the expenditure materially enhances the 
puted as follows. Depreciation will be allowed at the rate of $25,641 per year 
($1,000,000 divided by 39 years). Assuming a combined federal and state income 
tax rate of 40%, the tax benefit will be $10,256 per year ($25,641 x 40%). The 
present value of a $10,256 benefit over 39 years with an assumed interest rate of 
12% is $84,438. 
The effect of the above calculation is that for each dollar spent on cleanup 
costs, X Corporation's net cost is 92 cents-the other 8 cents is contributed by the 
federal and state government in the form of an income tax deduction. 
36. 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962). 
37. The Service has subsequently referred to this test as the "restoration 
principle." See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
38. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338 (emphasis added). 
39. Id. 
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value, use, life expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared 
with the status of the asset prior to the condition necessitating 
the e~penditure."~~ In applying the Plainfield-Union restora- 
tion principle to environmental cleanup situations, the issue is 
whether the value of the property before the contamination is 
equal to the value of the property after the contamination has 
been removed. If the values are roughly equivalent, the cleanup 
costs are deductible as a repair expense under § 162.~' 
The restoration principle has not been uniformly applied 
by the Service in determining the deductibility of environmen- 
tal cleanup costs.42 Additionally, the decision by the U.S. Su- 
preme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. u. C o m m i ~ s i o n e r ~ ~  has been 
interpreted to require capitalization in many instances and 
raises concerns over whether the restoration principle of 
Plainfield- Union still applies. 
B. INDOPCO v. Commissioner 
INDOPCO u. C o m m i ~ s i o n e r ~ ~  is considered "the most au- 
thoritative, current pronouncement on the issue of capitaliza- 
t i~n . "~ '  The Supreme Court held that when two corporations 
reorganize, one becoming a subsidiary of the other, the profes- 
sional fees of the reorganization must be capitalized since they 
provide significant future benefits to the  corporation^.^^ Since 
environmental cleanup costs will undoubtedly provide future 
40. Id. 
41. For example, assume a taxpayer purchases land for $100,000. The taxpay- 
er commences manufacturing operations on the property and subsequently contami- 
nates the soil. In year five, the land in its contaminated state is valued a t  $50,000 
while other similar properties without contamination remain valued at  $100,000. 
After $60,000 is spent on soil remediation, the value of the land is once again 
$100,000. The soil remediation causes the value of the land to double. Since the 
value of the "repair" materially adds to the value of the property, a strict appli- 
cation of Treasury Regulation 5 1.162-4 causes the soil remediation costs to be 
capitalized. Treas. Reg. 5 1.162-4 (as amended in 1960). However, under the 
Plainfield-Union test, the value of the land before the contamination is equal to 
the value of the land after the cleanup expenditures. Consequently, $60,000 is 
deductible in the current year as an ordinary and necessary business expense. See 
Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338; Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
42. Compare Rev. Rul. 94-38, 19941 C.B. 35 with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 
(Mar. 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 
(Oct. 2, 1992). 
43. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
44. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
45. Larry Witner & Michael Lynch, Tax Consequences of Environmental 
Clean-Up Costs: An Updated History, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 268, 270 (1995). 
46. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at  87-89. 
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benefits, a strict application of INDOPCO would apparently 
require all cleanup costs to be capitalized. However, like most 
broad tests, some exceptions apply. 
1. Matching revenues with expenses for environmental clean- 
up costs as  a compelling reason for an exception to a strict 
application of INDOPCO 
Requiring environmental cleanup costs to be capitalized 
under 5 263 offends the underlying policy of the Internal Reve- 
nue Code of matching expenses with the revenues those ex- 
penses produce.47 The Service has stated that "the Internal 
Revenue Code generally endeavors to match expenses with the 
revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are prop- 
erly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calcula- 
tion of net income for tax  purpose^.'"^ For example, if X Cor- 
poration spends $50,000 in 1996 to purchase a delivery truck 
that is to be used for seven years in its business of selling 
widgets, the entire purchase price should not be deducted in 
1996. Instead, the cost of the truck should be capitalized and 
depreciated over the useful life of the truck. Under this ap- 
proach, the revenue produced by the delivery truck in one par- 
ticular year is partially offset by the amount of the truck's 
purchase price allocated to that year. Thus, matching income 
with expenses more accurately portrays taxable income for a 
particular year.49 
Unlike the purchase of a truck, the costs associated with 
remedial cleanup activities generally are attributable to past 
income rather than future income. For example, if, in the pro- 
duction of widgets, X Corporation creates a hazardous by-prod- 
uct that is stockpiled on its property rather than properly dis- 
posed of, the net income for X Corporation is overstated. The 
reason for the overstatement of income is that disposing of the 
hazardous waste is an expense associated with the production 
of the widgets already manufactured, but this expense has not 
yet been recognized. Rather than capitalize subsequent expen- 
ditures for environmental cleanup and reduce future income, a 
more accurate matching of revenues with expenses would re- 
quire the costs to be deducted to offset current income.50 Yet, 
47. See id. at 84; Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 US. 1, 16 (1974). 
48. Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (citing INDOPCO, 503 US. at 84; Idaho 
Power, 418 US. at 16). 
49. See id. 
50. The most accurate method of matching revenues with expenses would be 
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since the cleanup will benefit future periods of income, 
INDOPCO's future benefits test would apparently require capi- 
talization of the expenditures. 
In developing an exception to INDOPCO for environmental 
cleanup costs, two exceptions previously recognized by the Ser- 
vice are relevant, namely, severance payments and advertising 
expenses. 
2. An analogy between environmental cleanup costs and sever- 
ance payments: an exception to a strict application of 
INDOPCO 
Severance payments are generally used in connection with 
a business down-sizing in which employees are compensated for 
early dismissal. ARer down-sizing, a business may be in a more 
favorable position to minimize losses and/or maximize gains. 
Consequently, severance benefits generally will provide future 
benefits-thus making the expenditures subject to capitaliza- 
tion under the INDOPCO decision. Revenue Ruling 94-77 dealt 
with whether INDOPCO affects the deductibility of severance 
payments made by a taxpayer to its  employee^.^' The Service 
indicated: 
[Allthough severance payments made by a taxpayer to its 
employees in connection with a business down-sizing may 
produce some future benefits, such as reducing operating 
costs and increasing operating efficiencies, these payments 
principally relate to previously rendered services of those 
employees. Therefore, such severance payments are generally 
deductible as business expenses under 5 162 and 8 1.162- 
A similarity can be drawn between expenditures related to 
environmental cleanup costs and severance benefits. Although 
both types of expenditures may contribute to "reducing operat- 
to allow the costs to be carried back to prior years to offset prior income. This 
might occur if expenses exceed revenues in the current tax year and a net operat- 
ing loss (NOL) results. I.R.C. 5 172 allows an NOL to offset income in "each of the 
[three] taxable years preceding the taxable year of such loss." I.R.C. 
5 172(b)(l)(A)(i) (1994). 
51. Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19. 
52. Id. Revenue Ruling 94-77 goes on to state that certain limitations still 
apply. For example, "if severance payments that would otherwise be deductible 
under section 162 are made to employees under a plan, method, or arrangement 
deferring the receipt of compensation, these payments are deductible under section 
404(a) subject to the limitations thereof." Id. 
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ing costs and increasing operating efficiencies," both are also 
attributable to previously incurred income and expenses. Thus 
in order to "match expenses with the revenues of the taxable 
period to which the expenses are properly a t t r ib~table ,"~~ en- 
vironmental cleanup expenditures, like severance benefits, 
should be allowed a current deduction under 5 162 of the Inter- 
nal Revenue Code. 
3. An analogy between environmental cleanup costs and ad- 
vertising expenses; an exception to a strict application of 
INDOPCO 
Revenue Ruling 9 2 - 8 0 ~ ~  indicates that "[tlhe INDOPCO 
decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs un- 
der section 162(a) of the Code. These costs are generally de- 
ductible under that section even though advertising may have 
some future effect on business activities, as in the case of insti- 
tutional or goodwill ad~ertising."~~ According to Revenue Rul- 
ing 92-80, even though advertising expenditures will benefit 
future periods, they are deductible under the theory that they 
maintain corporate Advertising, therefore, is con- 
sidered an "incidental renair," deductible under Treasury Regu- 
lation section 1. 162-4.57 
53. Id. 
54. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
55. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. $8 1.162-l(a) (as amended in 1993), 1.162-20(a)(2) 
(as amended in 1969). 
56. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. 
57. Treas. Reg. 8 1.162-4 (1960). To explore the concept that even expendi- 
tures for the most expensive advertising campaigns can be considered a current 
deduction, one only needs to look to the extraordinary event known as the 
Superbowl. For roughly four hours, viewers are intermittently blitzed with advertis- 
ing campaigns that are tremendously costly. Kevin Goldman, Superbowl Ad Teams 
Drop Ball, Calling Dull, Old Plays, WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 1, 1995, a t  4 ("Spon- 
sors paid on average $1 million for a 30-second spot" in Superbowl XK).  For ex- 
ample, Coopers & Lybrand, a "Big Six" accounting firm, bucked the previous tradi- 
tion of no national advertising in the accounting industry and spent millions of 
dollars on a 30 second advertising spot in Superbowl XVII. Richard Greene & 
Katherine Barrett, Auditing the Accounting Firms, FINANCIAL WORLD, Sept. 27, 
1994, a t  30. In Superbowl XM, Nike spokesperson Stanley Craver (Dennis Hopper) 
rambled for 90 seconds about his love for the game of football-a $3 million dollar 
speech! Stanley Ads Strengthening Nike's Super Bowl Connection, ORLANDO SENTI- 
NEL, Jan. 29, 1995, a t  H4. Can a current deduction for such extremely expensive 
advertisements be justified along the reasoning that the expense is merely an "inci- 
dental repair to corporate goodwill"? Although the Superbowl commercials undoubt- 
edly influence corporate goodwill and thus should be expected to benefit future 
periods, Revenue Ruling 92-80 creates an exception to the INDOPCO decision and 
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One important reason why a corporation would want to 
voluntarily commence cleanup activities is to maintain corpo- 
rate goodwill. Like advertising expenses, environmental 
cleanup can be viewed as an "incidental repair'' used to main- 
tain a corporate image, and therefore should be deductible 
under Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4. 
In summary, an exception to the future benefits test of 
INDOPCO for environmental cleanup costs can be supported by 
three theories: (1) matching revenues with expenses, (2) the 
similarity between environmental cleanup costs and deductible 
severance payments, and (3) the similarity between environ- 
mental cleanup costs and advertising. 
C. Pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service 
The Internal Revenue Service has released a number of 
pronouncements that have attempted to balance $8 162 and 
263 of the Code with Plainfield-Union and INDOPCO. Unfortu- 
nately, the Service has not been consistent in its application of 
the law concerning environmental cleanup costs. These incon- 
sistencies are revealed by an analysis of the Service's rulings 
concerning two significant environmental issues, asbestos 
abatement, and soil remediation. 
1. Asbestos abatement 
PLR 9240004~~ is the first of two letter rulings from the 
Service concerning asbestos abatement." This ruling ad- 
dressed the deduction claimed by a taxpayer for the removal of 
asbestos insulation. The taxpayer argued that the costs (1) 
were "minor in relation to the total repair costs" and value of 
the equipment, (2) did not add value to, prolong the life of, or 
increase the efficiency of the equipment, and (3) merely re- 
stored the equipment to the value it had prior to the time the 
taxpayer discovered the asbestos problem.60 The IRS deter- 
mined that the value of the taxpayer's property had increased, 
allows these expenditures to be currently deducted under !j 162. 
58. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1992). 
59. There are three accepted methods of asbestos abatement: (1) encapsula- 
tion, (2) removal, and (3) enclosure. 40 C.F.R. !j 763.83 (1994). Encapsulation in- 
volves the coating and sealing of walls, ceilings, pipes, or other structures. Id. 
Removal involves the elimination of asbestos from the property. Id. Enclosure in- 
volves the construction of a barrier between the asbestos and the environment. Id. 
60. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Od. 2, 1992). 
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thus creating a permanent improvement to the property. Con- 
sequently, the expenditures would provide significant future 
benefits and thus all cleanup costs should be ~apitalized.~' 
Two years later, the Service, in PLR 9411002, ventured 
into dangerous territory by holding that expenditures for tem- 
porary asbestos abatement may be deductible, but expenditures 
for permanent abatement must be ~apital ized.~~ In this ruling, 
the taxpayer was required by its lender to remove all asbestos- 
containing materials from its boiler house. Additionally, the 
taxpayer was required to encapsulate damaged asbestos-con- 
taining pipe insulation in its w a r e h ~ u s e . ~ ~  
The Service held that the removal of asbestos resulted in 
capital expenditures since "the asbestos removal costs in- 
creased the value, use, and capacity of the taxpayer's facili- 
ty."64 TO support its position, the Service pointed out that the 
asbestos-free building was much more valuable than the as- 
bestos-contaminated building since the removal of asbestos (1) 
"created better operating conditions," (2) made the property 
"significantly more attractive to potential buyers," and (3) en- 
abled the taxpayer to provide additional office space and a 
garage free of the asbestos hazard? The Senrice distin- 
guished Plainfield-Union by asserting that costs to remove 
asbestos "permanently eliminated the defect," therefore the 
expenditures were "not similar to incidental repair costs, but 
must be capitalized as permanent improvements under section 
263 of the Code? 
For the temporary solution of asbestos encapsulation,6' 
the Service concluded that "encapsulation of asbestos-contain- 
ing materials . . . constitute incidental repair costs that neither 
materially add to the value of [the] property nor appreciably 
prolong its life."68 The consequence of this ruling is to treat a 
temporary remedy as deductible under 5 162, but a permanent 
remedy as adding value to the property, hence requiring capi- 
talization of the expenditures under 5 263." Allowing deduo 
61. Id. 
62. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (asserting that the remedy in Plainfield-Union was only temporary in 
nature). 
67. See supra note 59 for a definition of encapsulation. 
68. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994). 
69. Id. PLR 9411002 does not indicate whether enclosure of asbestos is con- 
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tions for temporary solutions while requiring capitalization of 
permanent remedies is not sound tax policy. The tax savings 
could entice some companies to opt for a deductible "quick fix7' 
rather than a permanent remedy for the situation. Both PLR 
9240004 and PLR 9411002 focus on the immediate increase of 
value asbestos abatement will have on property and fail to give 
significance to the restoration principle of Plainfield- Union.?' 
If the Plainfield-Union restoration principle were applied 
to both PLR 9411002 and PLR 9240004, the outcomes probably 
would have been different.?' The deductibility of the removal 
of asbestos would focus on the value of the asset after the re- 
moval compared with the value of the asset before the asbestos 
was determined to be a health hazard.72 If the value of the 
asset had increased, then the expenditures would be capitalized 
under 5 263. If the value of the asset had not increased, the 
costs would be deductible under 5 162, regardless of whether 
the remedy was permanent or temporary. 
2. Soil remediation 
Both Revenue Ruling 94-38 and PLR 9315004 involve soil 
remediation issues. In PLR 9315004,~~ the EPA required the 
taxpayer to clean up contamination of soil and underground 
water caused by the taxpayer dumping lubricants containing 
PCB into surrounding earthen pits.?' To support a current 
deduction under Q 162, the taxpayer asserted that the cleanup 
simply restored the property to its value prior to contamina- 
tion, thus the "incidental repair" was deductible under 
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4 by applying the restoration 
principle of plainfield-Uni~n.'~ The taxpayer also argued that 
the future benefits test of INDOPCO did not apply since the 
cleanup costs related to past a~ t iv i t i e s .~~  The IRS disagreed 
sidered a temporary or permanent remedy. 
70. Three months after PLR 9411002, the Service released Revenue Ruling 
94-38, which adopted the Plainfield-Union restoration principle without discussion 
of whether a remedy must be permanent or temporary. 
71. Glenn R. Carrington, Tax Treatment of Environmental Clean-Up Costs, in 
CREATIVE TAX PLANNING FOR REAL ESTATE !t'RANSACTIONS, at 863, 870 (A.L.1.- 
A.B.A. Course of Study (2967, 1994). 
72. Id. 
73. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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with the taxpayer's position and ruled that the costs were not 
incidental under Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4 since "the 
cleanup operations . . . constitute a general plan of rehabilita- 
tion and restoration of taxpayer's proper tie^."^^ In addition, 
the IRS minimized the importance of the Plainfield-Union test 
and held that the "taxpayer's property will be more valuable in 
its business after it is cleaned of PCB residues [than property 
that is] in need of remediati~n."~~ This proposition is clearly 
reversed in Revenue Ruling 94-38. 
Unlike previous pronouncements, Revenue Ruling 94-38 
fully embraces the restoration principle of Plainfield-Union." 
Revenue Ruling 94-38 involved a taxpayer who commenced a 
three-year process of replacing contaminated soil with uncon- 
taminated soil.80 In addition, the taxpayer began construction 
of groundwater treatment facilities including wells, pipes, 
pumps, and other equipment." In a "burst of sanity,"82 the 
Service reversed its position in PLR 9315004 and concluded 
that soil remediation and groundwater treatment costs do not 
(1) increase the value of the land, (2) prolong the useful life of 
the land, or (3) adapt the land to a new or different use." In 
adopting the restoration principle of Plainfield- Union, the Ser- 
vice stated: 
Under the facts of this ruling, the appropriate test for deter- 
mining whether the expenditures increase the value of prop- 
erty is to compare the status of the asset after the expendi- 
ture with the status of that asset before the condition arose 
that necessitated the expenditure (i.e., before the land was 
contaminated by X's hazardous waste)." 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Martin D. Ginsburg & Jack S. Levin, Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions and 
Buyouts--Summary of the Basic Tax and Legal Considerations, in TAX STRA~GIES 
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, PIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES AND OTH- 
ER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, FINANCINGS, RBORGANIZATIONS, AND ~STRUCTURINGS 
1994, at 7 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 359, 
1994). 
83. Rev. Rul. 9438, 19941 C.B. 35; see Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amend- 
ed in 1994). 
84. Rev. Rul. 9438, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
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Finding that the value of the land had not increased under the 
restoration principle, the Service concluded that "soil 
remediation expenditures and ongoing groundwater treatment 
expenditures . . . do not produce permanent improvements to 
X's land within the scope of 8 263(a)(1) or otherwise provide 
significant future  benefit^."^' Noticeably absent from Revenue 
Ruling 94-38 was a discussion of whether the three-year reha- 
bilitation of the soil and groundwater constituted a general 
plan of rehabilitation, or whether the expenditures were consid- 
ered "incidental repairs? 
Applying the elements of Treasury Regulation 5 1.263(a)- 
l(b),87 the Service allowed a current deduction for soil 
remediation costs and properly required capitalization of costs 
associated with constructing assets to monitor possible future 
  on tam in at ion.^^ Although Revenue Ruling 94-38 allows a cur- 
rent deduction under § 162 for soil remediation and groundwa- 
ter treatment costs, the ruling did not make it clear whether 
its rationale applies to other cleanup activities. 
3. Recent application of the restoration principle 
The taxpayer in TAM 9541005~~ attempted to apply the 
rationale of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to expenses associated with 
contamination studies, legal fees, and consulting fees afker its 
land was designated as a Superfund site under CERCLkgO 
The taxpayer had for nearly two decades used an island as a 
site "for the disposal of industrial waste such as agricultural 
chemical wastes and coke oven by-products ."gl The taxpayer 
had attempted to donate the property to the county to be used 
as a recreational park,92 but when the county discovered the 
85. Id. 
86. Cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993). In PLR 9315004, the expen- 
ditures to remove PCB contamination &om the soil were required by the Service to 
be capitalized since they were "not repairs within the meaning of section 1.162-4 of 
the Income Tax Regulations" and they "constitute[dl a general plan of rehabilita- 
tion." Id. 
87. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
88. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
89. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
90. Id.; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. 55 9601-9675 (1994); see also infra note 117 and accompanying text 
(discussing the effectiveness of CERCLA). 
91. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005. 
92. The taxpayer "claimed a deduction under section 170 of the Code for its 
contribution of the [lland to the County based on the fair market value of the 
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contamination, it conveyed the land back to the taxpayer for 
one dollar. 
Although no cleanup of hazardous waste had yet occurred, 
the taxpayer argued that the restoration principle allowed a 
current deduction for contamination study costs, legal fees, and 
consulting fees since the expenditures did "not result in im- 
provements that increased the value of the property."g3 The 
Service held that the restoration principle did not apply to this 
case since the taxpayer had purchased the land from the coun- 
ty in a "contaminated c~ndit ion."~~ The restoration principle 
"applies only if a taxpayer's environmental remediation expen- 
ditures restore the contaminated property to what was its un- 
contaminated condition at  the time it was acquired by the tax- 
payer."g5 Although a current deduction was not allowed in this 
ruling, TAM 9541005 does indicate the Service's continuing 
reliance on Plainfield- Union's restoration principle. The Service 
outlined three requirements in order for the restoration princi- 
ple of Plainfield-Union to apply.96 The taxpayer must (1) "ac- 
quire the property in a clean condition," (2) "contaminate the 
property in the course of its everyday business operations," and 
(3) "incur costs to restore the property to its condition at  the 
time the taxpayer originally acquired the property."g7 The first 
requirement precludes application of the restoration principle 
when contamination of property is attributable to a previous 
owner. Absent reliance on the restoration principle, a taxpayer 
is left to shoulder the burden of satisfjnng the four-prong test 
of Treasury Regulation section 1. 162-4.98 
[lland," even though taxpayer was aware of the contamination of the land. Upon a 
subsequent review of taxpayer's tax returns, an agreed adjustment was made that 
"reduced the total allowable charitable contribution to the amount of the original 
basis in the land." Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.162-4 (1960). The Service may only allow a current 
deduction for prior contamination if the remedy is temporary. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994) (holding that costs associated with temporary asbestos 
abatement are deductible, but costs associated with permanent removal of asbestos 
must be capitalized). See infra note 132 and accompanying text for "innocent land- 
owner" defense. 
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4. Summary of the Service's position on the deductibility of 
environmental cleanup costs 
After reviewing the most recent pronouncements of the 
Internal Revenue Service, a number of presumptions can be 
drawn about the deductibility of environmental cleanup costs. 
First, the future benefits test of INDOPCO will not be strictly 
applied." Second, the restoration principle of Plainfield-Un- 
ion1" will be applied, provided that the taxpayer (i) acquire 
the property in a clean condition, (ii) contaminate the property 
in the course of its everyday business operations, and (iii) incur 
costs to restore the property to its condition at  the time the 
taxpayer originally acquired the property. lo' Third, soil 
remediation and groundwater treatment costs are deductible if 
expenditures do not (i) increase the value of the property (using 
the restoration principle), (ii) substantially prolong the useful 
life of the property, or (iii) adapt the property to a new or dif- 
ferent use.lo2 Fourth, a three-year soil remediation plan is 
not considered a general plan of rehabilitation.lo3 
What remains uncertain is whether deductibility of clean- 
up costs will extend to other cleanup activities such as under- 
ground storage tank removal,lo4 asbestos removal, or legal 
fees incurred in cleanup activities. TAM 9541005 disallows a 
current deduction for legal fees,''' but its broad interpreta- 
tion of Revenue Ruling 94-38 suggests all environmental clean- 
up costs are eligible for a deduction under § 162 if the require- 
ments of the restoration principle have been met.lo6 Such a 
conclusion can be drawn by looking at the broad language used 
in TAM 9541005. The phrase "environmental remediation ex- 
penditures"lo7 is used in the memorandum rather than "soil 
remediation expenditures." The inference is that the type of 
99. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
100. 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962). 
101. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
102. See Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1994). 
103. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
104. Leaking underground storage tanks represent a significant 
hazard to the environment. It is estimated that between 350,000 and 400,000 un- 
derground storage tanks in the United States are leaking environmentally hazard- 
ous materials, with a total cleanup cost of $32 billion. Amy A. Ripepi, Environmen- 
tal Remediation Liabilities: An Accountant's Perspective, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 395, 
397 (1994). 
105. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
106. See id. 
107. Id. 
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hazardous materials being cleaned up is not the determinative 
factor in whether the costs may be deducted under 5 162. The 
true test is whether the expenditures meet the restoration 
principle set forth in  lai infield- Union. log 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL C EANUP 
The cleanup of environmentally hazardous materials in- 
volves numerous conflicting social and tax policies. The nation- 
al debt poses a tremendous restriction on viable options avail- 
able to the government to clean up existing hazardous sites 
itself, or to offer tax incentives to polluters to induce voluntary 
cleanup.log Before proposing a method by which the I.R.S. 
should determine whether cleanup costs are currently deduct- 
ible, it is important to understand the competing policies un- 
derlying this issue. 
A. National Debt 
As the national debt continues its ascent to astronomical 
new heights, reducing the deficit and the national debt is be- 
coming an increasingly pressing issue. The Republican Con- 
tract With America attempted to address this issue by requir- 
ing a balanced budget by the year 2002."~ As evidenced in 
November of 1995, The Republican Congress is even willing to 
risk default on government obligations and permit the govern- 
ment to shut down in order to achieve this goal."' In order to 
attain a balanced budget, a combination of two events must oc- 
cur: (1) revenues must increase, and (2) spending must de- 
crease. Contrary to this simple formula, environmental cleanup 
expenditures may result in a decrease of tax revenues (if costs 
are currently deducted) and an increase in government spend- 
ing (if government intervention is expanded). 
108. 39 T.C. at 338. 
109. See infra part 1V.B. 
110. Although the balanced budget amendment was defeated in the Senate in 
March of 1995, the Republicans are still optimistic that a balanced budget will be 
achieved by the year 2002. Robert J. Samuelson, Deliver Now, Pay Later, T H E  
WASH. POST, April 12, 1995, at A25. 
111. David Wessel & Jackie Calmes, Clinton, GOP Leaders Play the Waiting 
Game To See Who Will Blink First in Budget Battle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1995, 
at A16. 
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1. Decrease of tax revenues 
If the before-and-after test of Plainfield-Union is applied to 
the cleanup of all environmentally hazardous material, the 
decrease in tax revenues could be enormous. If deductible 
cleanup expenses amounted to $160 billion each year,ll2 the 
lost tax revenue could be as high as $56 billion.ll3 Such a 
large amount of lost tax revenue would significantly inhibit 
Congress's ability to eliminate deficit spending and the five tril- 
lion dollar national debt. 
2. Increase in government spending 
The obligation to clean up environmentally hazardous 
waste is not limited to corporate America. As reported in The 
Washington Post in July of 1993, "The federal government has 
been fouling its own nest and taxpayers will ultimately have to 
pay tens of billions of dollars to clean it up."'l4 The article 
quoted Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), chairman of the Demo- 
cratic staff of the House Natural Resources Committee as stat- 
ing, "'As a result of inadequate laws and decades of neglect, the 
American taxpayer will be saddled with billions of dollars in 
cleanup costs. These costs currently do not appear on any bud- 
get ledger, yet they are genuine liabilities that the taxpayer 
will one day in~ur."'"~ Thus, while Congress is grappling 
with the method to reduce deficit spending, tens of billions of 
dollars may be needed in the next decade alone to clean up 
government-owned property. 
112. Langer, supra note 2 a t  129. 
113. $160,000,000 x 35% = $56,000,000 (assuming a corporate tax rate of 35%). 
114. Tom Kenworthy, Land Cleanup In Billions Foreseen; 'Decades of Neglect' 
Confiont Taxpayers, THE WMH. POST, July 9, 1993, a t  A19. 
115. Id. (quoting Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.)). 
116. For example, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have attempted 
to reduce defense spending by closing certain military bases across the nation. See 
Robert S. Greenberger, Bush Suggests a Coup May Be Best Way To End Iraq's 
Nuclear Arms Efforts, WALL ST. J. ,  July 11, 1993, at  A2 (President Bush "an- 
nounced that he had accepted the recommendations of a commission on military 
base closings."); Clinton, With Reluctance, Approves Closing of Bases, WALL ST. J . ,  
July 14, 1995, at  A4 ("President Clinton reluctantly approved a list of recommend- 
ed military base closings . . . ."). However, by closing a base, the government must 
face cleanup of waste left from decades of military activities. 
Almost 100,000 acres of land controlled by the Interior Department's 
Bureau of Land Management are heavily contaminated with unexploded 
ordnance from military firing exercises that will be tremendously difficult 
to remove. The problem is likely to get worse as BLM takes over bases 
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Government spending for environmental cleanup costs is 
also increasing under CERCLA and its "Superfund" sites 
throughout the nation. 'I7 
closed as part of the military's downsizing. For example, the agency may 
take over 8,000 acres of firing range at  Fort Ord, California, that could 
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per acre to make safe. 
Kenworthy, supra note 114 (citing the report of the Democratic House Natural 
Resources Committee). 
An example of how costly a base closure may be is shown by the closing of 
Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG) near Madison, Indiana. Since World War 11, JPG 
had served as a major weapons testing facility for the Army, causing considerable 
contamination to more than one hundred square miles of southeastern Indiana. 
Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning Up Mili- 
tary Wastes When U.S. Bases are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 870 (1994). 
The Base Closure Commission originally estimated that closing the JPG 
would cost only $30 million . . . [blut to remove all bombs and other 
unexploded ordnance from the JPG, the Army would have to strip the 
entire facility to a depth of thirty feet, using specially armored bulldozers 
to do so; the Army estimates this task could cost $5 to $10 billion, and 
other estimates suggest as high as $13 billion. 
Id. Consequently, the cost for closing the base would be over 300 times more ex- 
pensive than originally anticipated. See id. 
117. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. 8 9607 (1994). 
[CERCLAI was a reaction to public panic over Love Canal, the residential 
development built near an old chemical dump in upstate New York. 
There were supposedly about 500 other Love Canals. The EPA would 
identify these "ticking time bombs," and force "responsible parties" to 
clean them up pronto via suits and threats of civil penalties. The pro- 
gram was supposed to phase itself out five years and perhaps $1.6 billion 
later. 
Charlotte Allen, Environmental Folly: Superfund Toxic Problems Require More Than 
a Quick Fix, BARRON'S, Sept. 12, 1994, at  62. CERCLA has not been looked upon 
favorably as evidenced by the following comments: 
[Tlhe authors of [CERCLA] attempted to harness the tort system to pay 
for cleaning up the environment. Instead of collecting taxes to underwrite 
all the cleanup, Congress chose to rely mainly on the liability system: the 
filing of civil suits for tort damages against landowners, chemical compa- 
nies and waste transporters. 
That means treating them like wrongdoers, even though the over- 
whelming majority broke no federal, state or local laws in effect a t  the 
time of the dumping. Many not only had proper permits but were comply- 
ing with state mandates. 
[CERCLA] is thus a system of retroactive liability-a concept that is 
unconstitutional in the criminal sector (we don't allow ex post facto laws) 
and ought to be equally unconstitutional in the civil sector (it's taking 
property without compensation). 
Congress got away with this perversion of justice because big chemical 
companies make convenient villains. The same cowboys-and-Indians men- 
tality underlies the Clinton Administration's current reluctance to abolish 
retroactive liability. "That would let Corporate America off the hook," a 
horrified EPA official declared recently. 
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There are now some 38,000 Superfimd sites nationwide. . . . 
About 1,300 of them are on a "national priority list" of sites so 
noxious that they presumably require immediate federal in- 
tervention. Estimates of total cleanup costs range from $300 
billion to $1 trillion, and the job is expected to take at least 
30 years.llS 
Although the federal government under CERCLA is to be 
reimbursed by "potentially responsible parties" for any cleanup 
expenditures incurred, the government has been unsuccessful 
in large scale recoveries-$6.8 billion of the $7.3 billion expend- 
ed through fiscal 1992 has not been reimb~rsed."~ Conse- 
quently, EPA involvement in cleanup activities undoubtedly 
will prove extremely costly to the federal government, thereby 
senring as another catalyst to increase the national debt. 
B. Encouraging Polluters to Voluntarily Clean Up 
Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup of Superfund sites has proven to be slow and 
inefficient. In the 14 years of the EPA's Superfund existence, 
the EPA has spent $9.1 billion in moving 13 million cubic yards 
of environmental waste.l2' In comparison, Kennecott Copper 
mine located southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah has moved 13 
million cubic yards of environmental waste at a cost of $80 
mi1li0n.l~~ From this comparison, i t  appears that the most 
cost effective method of environmental cleanup occurs at the 
corporate, rather than the government level. One reason for the 
inefficiency at the government level is the enormous litigation 
expenses incurred both by private parties and by the govern- 
ment. "Recent estimates of transaction costs [from litigation 
and related expenses] have ranged from 30 percent to 70 per- 
cent of total cleanup costs."122 Thus, according to these esti- 
mates, a substantial percent of the expenses associated with 
cleanup under CERCLA may go to lawyers, rather then being 
Id. 
118. Allen, supra note 117, at 62. 
119. Id. 
120. Peter Samuel, Treasure House or Pollution Pit?, FORBES, Sept. 12, 1994, 
at 54, 58. 
121. Id. 
122. Peter B. Prestley, The Future of Superfund: After the Rio Summit, Domes- 
tic Policy Won't be the Same, 79 Aug. A.B.A. J .  62, 62 (1993). 
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spent on actual cleanup a~tivi t ies . '~~ To alleviate enormous 
federal spending on Superfund sites, the federal government 
should seek methods to encourage corporations to engage in 
voluntary cleanup of environmental waste before costly EPA in- 
tervention is necessary. ks previously discussed, allowing a 
deduction for cleanup costs could result in up to a thirty-two 
percent reduction in cleanup expenditures for a corpora- 
tion.lu Such a significant tax savings could serve as a pivotal 
factor for a corporation in determining whether to proceed with 
voluntary cleanup activities. 
Allowing a current tax deduction for environmental clean- 
up expenditures represents a double-edged sword for the feder- 
al government, however. If current deductions are allowed 
under 162, the government will lose tax revenue.125 In con- 
trast, without the incentive of current deductibility, corpora- 
tions may not be willing or able to clean up hazardous waste. 
This could eventually lead to the EPA declaring more 
Superfund sites, thus causing governmental expenditures, and 
the national debt, to increase. 
If a current deduction is allowed for cleanup activities, the 
lost revenue to the government should be considered an "in- 
vestment" in the environmental stability of the United States. 
The return on this "investment" may even prove to be economi- 
cally profitable for the federal government considering that if a 
culpable company does not clean up its own environmental 
waste, the federal government may be obliged to do so. Conse- 
quently, allowing a current deduction now may prevent costly 
government involvement in the future. 
V. PROPOSED METHOD OF DETERMINING THE DEDUCTIBILITY 
OF CLEANUP COSTS 
To balance the two social policies that appear to be in 
direct conflict with one another-namely, decreasing the na- 
tional debt and encouraging voluntary cleanup of hazardous 
material~'~~-a two-step test is proposed in order for environ- 
mental cleanup costs to be deducted under s 162 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. First, the guidelines of Revenue Ruling 94-38 
123. Id. 
124. See supra part 1I.C. 
125. See supra part 1I.C. 
126. See supra part IV. 
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must be met, and second, the expenditures must be incurred in 
a voluntary cleanup activity. 
A. First Step: Satisfying the Guidelines of 
Revenue Ruling 94-38 
The first step of the proposal is to expand Revenue Ruling 
9 4 - 3 ~ ' ~ ~  to  apply to all environmental cleanup costs as long 
as the expenditures do not (1) increase the value of the proper- 
ty, (2) substantially prolong the useful life of the property, or 
(3) adapt the property to a new or different use. In determining 
whether these guidelines are met, the condition of the asset 
after the contamination is removed is compared with the condi- 
tion of the asset before the environmental contamination was 
determined to be a health hazard.'" If this "restoration prin- 
ciple" is met, then all costs, including environmental impact 
studies, attorney fees, and other professional fees, can be cur- 
rently deducted under I.R.C. § 162. Although cleanup of envi- 
ronmentally hazardous materials will generally provide future 
benefits, a strict application of INDOPCO'~~ will not be re- 
quired and an exception is created, much like the exceptions for 
severance benefits and advertising expenses. '" 
If contamination is attributable to a prior owner, a current 
deduction is permissible if the present owner paid an amount 
that would represent the fair market value of the property had 
the property been free and clear of all contamination (and the 
present owner did not know or should not have known of the 
contamination at the time of purchase). After hazardous mate- 
rials have been removed, the fair market value of the property 
will approximately equal what the purchaser paid for the prop- 
erty. Since no value has been added to the property, a deduc- 
tion is allowed for the cleanup costs, assuming the other guide- 
lines have also been met. A similar approach has been adopted 
by Congress in assessing liability under CERCLA.13' Accord- 
ing to the "innocent landowner defense," a nongovernment 
entity that intentionally acquires property may escape 
127. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
128. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962); Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
129. INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
130. See supra part III.B.2-3. 
131. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. 55 9607, 9601(A)-(C) (1994); see also supra note 117 and accompanying 
text for a discussion concerning the effectiveness of CERCLA. 
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CERCLA liability if: (1) the entity can establish that the haz- 
ardous substances were placed at  the site before the acquisition 
of the property, and (2) the entity exercised due diligence to 
detect contamination of the property before the purchase.132 
Consequently, CERCLA liability is avoided if the purchaser 
was unaware of the contamination at the time of the purchase. 
This "innocent landowner" should also be eligible for a current 
deduction for environmental cleanup expenditures. 
In contrast, if the present owner knew or should have 
known about the existing contamination of the property at  the 
time of purchase, any subsequent cleanup expenditures should 
be capitalized. In such a case, the purchase price is likely dis- 
counted to reflect the contingent liability of potential cleanup 
costs. Consequently, expenditures for environmental cleanup 
will increase the value of the land in the hands of the present 
owner, and thus such costs should be capitalized. 
The guidelines of the first step will serve as the mecha- 
nism to preserve the traditional notions of ordinary business 
expenses of 162 and capital expenditures of 8 263. 
B. Second Step: Voluntary Environmental Cleanup 
In order to qualify for a current deduction, an entity must 
engage in voluntary cleanup activities. The difficult part of the 
second step is defining the meaning of 'boluntary." Consequent- 
ly, it may be beneficial to address the purpose of the first re- 
quirement. As noted, the EPA appears to be relatively ineffi- 
cient in cleanup activities as compared to the private sec- 
tor.133 Thus, the objective of the second step is to encourage 
businesses to voluntarily commence cleanup activities to pre- 
vent intervention by the federal government. Although allowing 
current deductions for potentially billions of dollars in cleanup 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)-(C); see also 4 JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. 
LIPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL L W 317 (2d ed. 1993). 
In light of the due diligence requirement, and the relatively advanced 
techniques for detecting contamination, the innocent landowner defense is 
not likely to protect many current purchasezs from future CERCLA liabili- 
ty. The defense has, however, encouraged many current purchasers to 
conduct pre-acquisition environmental audits of the property to be ac- 
quired. 
Id. The innocent landowner defense can be used "by current property owners who 
acquired their CERCLA sites in the past, without knowing of the contamination, 
and now seek to invoke the defense to avoid CERCLA liability." Id. 
133. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
1346 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
activities will at  first appear to be a step in the wrong direction 
in eliminating the federal deficit, the deduction must be consid- 
ered an investment in the environmental stability of the United 
States-an investment that will pay dividends in the future by 
forcing environmental cleanup costs into the more efficient 
corporate sector, rather than leaving them in the more costly 
governmental sector. Consequently, "voluntary" should be de- 
fined as "not requiring governmental intervention." Defined as 
such, compliance with government regulations and directive 
orders would be considered "voluntary," but expenditures for 
cleanup of a Superfund site would not.134 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Encouraging voluntary environmental cleanup must be a 
primary concern of the federal government and should be re- 
garded as a long-term investment in America. considering the 
complexities surrounding the national debt, Congress is in the 
best position to implement an integrated plan that, first, serves 
to encourage voluntary cleanup of environmental waste by 
allowing a deduction under 9 162, and second, addresses the 
impact that a current deduction may have on the national debt. 
Some people may question whether the federal government can 
afford to allow billions of dollars of environmental expenditures 
to be currently deducted, but ultimately we must ask ourselves 
whether the federal government can afford not to. 
Steven G. Black 
134. Under this approach, the taxpayer in Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 would 
not be allowed a current deduction, even if the property had not been transferred 
after the taxpayer had contaminated the land. Since the land was designated as a 
Superfund site, an additional penalty is that the costs cannot be deducted under 
$ 162. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). 
